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Abstract
Data poisoning attacks aim to manipulate the model produced by a learning algorithm by adversarially modifying
the training set. We consider differential privacy as a defensive measure against this type of attack. We show that such
learners are resistant to data poisoning attacks when the adversary is only able to poison a small number of items.
However, this protection degrades as the adversary poisons more data. To illustrate, we design attack algorithms
targeting objective and output perturbation learners, two standard approaches to differentially-private machine learning.
Experiments show that our methods are effective when the attacker is allowed to poison sufficiently many training
items.
1 Introduction
As machine learning is increasingly used for consequential decisions in the real world, the security concerns have
received more and more scrutiny. Most machine learning systems were originally designed without much thought
to security, but researchers have since identified several kinds of attacks under the umbrella of adversarial machine
learning. The most well-known example is adversarial examples [19], where inputs are crafted to fool classifiers. More
subtle methods aim to recover training examples [8], or even extract the model itself [20].
In data poisoning attacks [2, 11, 14, 1, 13, 21, 15, 9, 23, 22], the adversary corrupts examples at training time to
manipulate the learned model. As is generally the case in adversarial machine learning, the rise of data poisoning
attacks has outpaced the development of robust defenses. While attacks are often evaluated against specific target
learning procedures, effective defenses should provide protection—ideally guaranteed—against a broad class of attacks.
In this paper, we study differential privacy [7, 6] as a general defensive technique against data poisoning. While
differential privacy was originally designed to formalize privacy—the output should not depend too much on any single
individual’s private data—it also provides a defense against data poisoning. Concretely, we establish quantitative
bounds on how much an adversary can change the distribution over learned models by manipulating a fixed number of
training items. We are not the first to design defenses to data poisoning [18, 17], but our proposal has several notable
strengths compared to previous work. First, our defense provides provable protection against a worst-case adversary.
Second, our defense is general. Differentially-private learning procedures are known for a wide variety of tasks, and
new algorithms are continually being proposed. These learners are all resilient against data poisoning.
We complement our theoretical bounds with an empirical evaluation of data poisoning attacks on differentially
private learners. Concretely, we design an attack based on stochastic gradient descent to search for effective training
examples to corrupt against specific learning algorithms. We evaluate attack on two private learners: objective
perturbation [10] and output perturbation [4]. Our evaluation confirms the theoretical prediction that private learners are
vulnerable to data poisoning attacks when the adversary can poison sufficiently many examples. A gap remains between
performance of attack and theoretical limit of data poisoning attacks—it seems like differential privacy provides a
stronger defense than predicted by theory. We discuss possible causes and leave further investigation to future work.
2 Preliminaries
Differential Privacy. Let the data space be Z = X × Y , where X is the feature space and Y is the label space. We
write D = ∪∞n=0Zn for the space of all training sets, and write D ∈ D for a particular training set. A randomized
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learnerM : D × Rd 7→ Θ maps a training set D and noise b ∈ Rd drawn from a distribution ν to a model in the model
space Θ.
Definition 1. (Differential Privacy) M is (, δ)-differentially-private if ∀D, D˜ ∈ D that differ by one item, and
∀S ⊂ Θ,
P (M(D, b) ∈ S) ≤ eP
(
M(D˜, b) ∈ S
)
+ δ, (1)
where the probability is taken over b ∼ ν. When δ = 0, we say thatM is -differentially private.
Many standard machine learning tasks can be phrased as optimization problems modeling empirical risk minimiza-
tion (ERM). Broadly speaking, there are two families of techniques in the privacy literature for solving these problems.
Objective perturbation injects noise into the objective function of a vanilla machine learner to train a randomized
model [4, 10, 16]. In contrast, output perturbation runs the vanilla learner but after training, it randomly perturbs the
output model [4]. We will consider data poisoning attacks against both kinds of learners.
Threat Model. We first fix the adversarial attack setting.
Knowledge of the attacker: The attacker has full knowledge of the full training set D and the differentially-private
machine learnerM, including the noise distribution ν. However, the attacker does not know the realization of b.
Ability of the attacker: The attacker is able to modify the clean training set D by changing the features or labels,
adding additional items, or deleting existing items. Nevertheless, we limit the attacker to modify at most k items.
Formally, the poisoned training set D˜ must lie in the ball B(D, k) ⊂ D, where the center is the clean data D and the
radius k is the maximum number of item changes.
Goal of the attacker: the attacker aims to force the (stochastic) model learned from the poisoned data θ˜ =M(D˜, b)
to achieve certain nefarious target. Formally, we define a cost function C : Θ 7→ R that measures how much the
poisoned model θ˜ deviates from the attack target. Then the attack problem can be formulated as minimizing an objective
function J :
min
D˜∈B(D,k)
J(D˜) := Eb
[
C(M(D˜, b))
]
. (2)
This formulation differs from previous works (e.g. [2, 14, 21]) because the differentially-private learner produces
a stochastic model, so the objective takes the expected value of C. We now show a few attack problem instances
formulated as (2).
Example 1. (Parameter-Targeting Attack) If the attacker wants the output model to be close to a target model θ′, the
attacker can define C(θ˜) = 12‖θ˜ − θ′‖2, a non-negative cost. Minimizing J(D˜) pushes the poisoned model close to θ′
in expectation.
Example 2. (Label-Targeting Attack) If the attacker wants small prediction error on an evaluation set {z∗i }i∈[m],
the attacker can define C(θ˜) = 1m
∑m
i=1 `(θ˜, z
∗
i ) where `(θ˜, z
∗
i ) is the loss on item z
∗
i = (x
∗
i , y
∗
i ). Minimizing J(D˜)
pushes the prediction on x∗i towards the target label y
∗
i .
Example 3. (Label-Aversion Attack) If the attacker wants to induce large prediction error on an evaluation set
{z∗i }i∈[m], the attacker can define C(θ˜) = − 1m
∑m
i=1 `(θ˜, z
∗
i ), a non-positive cost. Minimizing J(D˜) pushes the
prediction on x∗i away from the true label y
∗
i .
Now, we turn to our two main contributions. i) We show that differentially-private learners have some natural
immunity against data poisoning attacks. Specifically, in section 3 we present a lower bound on how much the attacker
can reduce J(D˜) under a fixed k (the number of changes). ii) When k increases, the attacker’s power grows and
it becomes possible to attack differentially-private learners. In section 4 we propose a stochastic gradient descent
algorithm to solve the attack optimization problem (2). To our knowledge, ours is the first data poisoning attack
targeting differentially-private learners.
3 Differential Privacy Resists Data Poisoning
Fixing the number of poisoned items k and a differentially private learner, can a powerful attacker achieve arbitrarily
low attack cost J(D˜)? We show that the answer is no: differential privacy implies a lower bound on how far J(D˜) can
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be reduced, so private learners are inherently resistant to data poisoning attacks. Previous work [12] proposed defenses
based on differential privacy, but for test-time attacks. While effective, these defenses require the classifier to make
randomized predictions. In contrast, our defense against data poisoning only requires the learning algorithm, not the
classification process, to be randomized.
Our first result is for -differentially private learners: if an attacker can manipulate at most k items in the clean data,
then the attack cost is lower bounded.
Theorem 1. LetM be an -differentially-private learner. Let J(D˜) be the attack cost, where D˜ ∈ B(D, k), then
J(D˜) ≥ e−kJ(D) (C ≥ 0),
J(D˜) ≥ ekJ(D) (C ≤ 0).
(3)
Proof. For any poisoned data D˜ ∈ B(D, k), one can view it as being produced by manipulating the clean data D k
times, where each time one item is changed. Thus one can apply Lemma 2 k times to obtain (3).
Lemma 2. LetM be an -differentially-private learner. Let J(D˜) be the attack cost, where D˜ ∈ B(D, 1), then
J(D˜) ≥ e−J(D), (C ≥ 0),
J(D˜) ≥ eJ(D), (C ≤ 0).
(4)
Proof. We first consider C ≥ 0. Define Θ(a) = {θ : C(θ) > a}, ∀a ≥ 0. Since D˜ ∈ B(D, 1), D˜ and D differ by at
most one item, thus differential privacy guarantees that ∀a ≥ 0,
P (M(D, b) ∈ Θ(a)) ≤ eP
(
M(D˜, b) ∈ Θ(a)
)
. (5)
Since J(D) is non-negative, by the integral identity, we have
J(D) = Eb [C(M(D, b))] =
∫ ∞
0
P (C(M(D, b)) > a) da =
∫ ∞
0
P (M(D, b) ∈ Θ(a)) da
≤
∫ ∞
0
eP
(
M(D˜, b) ∈ Θ(a)
)
da = e
∫ ∞
0
P
(
C(M(D˜, b)) > a
)
da = eJ(D˜).
(6)
Thus J(D˜) ≥ e−J(D). Next we consider C ≤ 0. Define Θ(a) = {θ : C(θ) < a}, ∀a ≤ 0. Again due toM being
differentially private,
P
(
M(D˜, b) ∈ Θ(a)
)
≤ eP (M(D, b) ∈ Θ(a)) . (7)
Since J(D˜) is non-positive, by the integral identity, we have
J(D˜) = Eb
[
C(M(D˜, b))
]
= −
∫ 0
−∞
P
(
C(M(D˜, b)) < a
)
da = −
∫ 0
−∞
P
(
M(D˜, b) ∈ Θ(a)
)
da
≥ −
∫ 0
−∞
eP (M(D, b) ∈ Θ(a)) da = −
∫ 0
−∞
eP (C(M(D, b)) < a) da = eJ(D).
(8)
Note that for C ≥ 0, Theorem 1 shows that no attacker can achieve the trivial lower bound J(D˜) = 0. For C ≤ 0,
although J(D˜) could be unbounded from below, Theorem 1 shows that no attacker can reduce J(D˜) arbitrarily. These
results crucially rely on the differential privacy property of M. Corollary 3 re-states the theorem in terms of the
minimum number of items an attacker has to modify in order to sufficiently reduce the attack cost J(D˜).
Corollary 3. LetM be an -differentially-private learner. Assume J(D) 6= 0. Let τ ≥ 1. Then the attacker has to
modify at least k ≥ d 1 log τe items in D in order to achieve
i). J(D˜) ≤ 1τ J(D) (C ≥ 0).
3
ii). J(D˜) ≤ τJ(D) (C ≤ 0).
Proof. For C ≥ 0, by Theorem 1, if D˜ ∈ B(D, k) then J(D˜) ≥ e−kJ(D). Since we require J(D˜) ≤ 1τ J(D), we
have e−kJ(D) ≤ 1τ J(D), thus k ≥ d 1 log τe. Similarly, one can prove the case for C ≤ 0.
To generalize Theorem 1 to (, δ)-private learners, we need an additional assumption that C is bounded.
Theorem 4. LetM be (, δ)-differentially-private and J(D˜) be the attack cost, where |C| ≤ C¯ and D˜ ∈ B(D, k).
Then,
J(D˜) ≥ max{e−k(J(D) + C¯δ
e − 1)−
C¯δ
e − 1 , 0} (C ≥ 0),
J(D˜) ≥ max{ek(J(D)− C¯δ
e − 1) +
C¯δ
e − 1 ,−C¯} (C ≤ 0).
(9)
Proof. We first consider 0 ≤ C ≤ C¯. For any poisoned data D˜ ∈ B(D, k), one can view it as being produced by
manipulating the clean data D k times, where each time one item is changed. Thus we have a sequence of intermediate
D˜i (0 ≤ i ≤ k), the data set where i items are poisoned. We define D˜0 = D and D˜k = D˜. Let Ji = J(D˜i), then
by Lemma 5
Ji ≥ e−(Ji−1 − C¯δ),∀1 ≤ i ≤ k. (10)
Adding C¯δe−1 to both sides, we have
Ji +
C¯δ
e − 1 ≥ e
−(Ji−1 − C¯δ) + C¯δ
e − 1 = e
−(Ji−1 +
C¯δ
e − 1). (11)
We then recursively apply (11) k times to obtain
Jk +
C¯δ
e − 1 ≥ e
−k(J0 +
C¯δ
e − 1) = e
−k(J(D) +
C¯δ
e − 1). (12)
Note Jk = J(D˜k) = J(D˜), thus we have
J(D˜) ≥ e−k(J(D) + C¯δ
e − 1)−
C¯δ
e − 1 . (13)
Also note that J(D˜) ≥ 0 trivially holds due to C ≥ 0, thus
J(D˜) ≥ max{e−k(J(D) + C¯δ
e − 1)−
C¯δ
e − 1 , 0}. (14)
Next, we consider −C¯ ≤ C ≤ 0. Define Ji as before, then by Lemma 5
Ji ≥ eJi−1 − C¯δ,∀1 ≤ i ≤ k. (15)
Subtracting both sides by C¯δe−1 we have
Ji − C¯δ
e − 1 ≥ e
−(Ji−1 − C¯δ
e − 1),∀1 ≤ i ≤ k. (16)
Thus we have
J(D˜)− C¯δ
e − 1 ≥ e
−k(J(D)− C¯δ
e − 1). (17)
Combined with the trivial lower bound −C¯, we have
J(D˜) ≥ max{e−k(J(D)− C¯δ
e − 1) +
C¯δ
e − 1 ,−C¯}. (18)
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Lemma 5. Let M be an (, δ)-differentially-private learner. Let J(D˜) be the attack cost, where |C| ≤ C¯ and
D˜ ∈ B(D, 1), then
J(D˜) ≥ e−(J(D)− C¯δ), (C ≥ 0),
J(D˜) ≥ eJ(D)− C¯δ, (C ≤ 0).
(19)
Proof. We first consider 0 ≤ C ≤ C¯. Define Θ(a) = {θ : C(θ) > a}, ∀a ≥ 0. Since D˜ ∈ B(D, 1), D˜ and D differ
by at most one item, thus the differential privacy guarantees that ∀a ≥ 0,
P (M(D, b) ∈ Θ(a)) ≤ eP
(
M(D˜, b) ∈ Θ(a)
)
+ δ. (20)
Note that J(D) is non-negative, thus by the integral identity, we have
J(D) = Eb [C(M(D, b))] =
∫ C¯
0
P (C(M(D, b)) > a) da =
∫ C¯
0
P (M(D, b) ∈ Θ(a)) da
≤
∫ C¯
0
(
eP
(
M(D˜, b) ∈ Θ(a)
)
+ δ
)
da = e
∫ C¯
0
P
(
C(M(D˜, b)) > a
)
da+ C¯δ = eJ(D˜) + C¯δ.
(21)
Rearranging we have J(D˜) ≥ e−(J(D)− C¯δ).
Next we consider −C¯ ≤ C ≤ 0. Define Θ(a) = {θ : C(θ) < a}, ∀a ≤ 0 Again, due toM being differentially
private, we have
P
(
M(D˜, b) ∈ Θ(a)
)
≤ eP (M(D, b) ∈ Θ(a)) + δ. (22)
Since J(D˜) is non-positive, by the integral identity, we have
J(D˜) = Eb
[
C(M(D˜, b))
]
= −
∫ 0
−C¯
P
(
C(M(D˜, b)) < a
)
da
= −
∫ 0
−C¯
P
(
M(D˜, b) ∈ Θ(a)
)
da ≥ −
∫ 0
−C¯
(eP (M(D, b) ∈ Θ(a)) + δ) da
= −e
∫ 0
−C¯
P (C(M(D, b)) < a) da− C¯δ = eJ(D)− C¯δ.
(23)
As a corollary, we can lower-bound the minimum number of modifications needed to sufficiently reduce attack cost.
Corollary 6. LetM be an (, δ)-differentially-private learner. Assume J(D) 6= 0. Then
i). (0 ≤ C ≤ C¯): in order to achieve J(D˜) ≤ 1τ J(D) for τ ≥ 1, the attacker has to modify at least the following
number of items in D.
k ≥ d1

log
(e − 1)J(D)τ + C¯δτ
(e − 1)J(D) + C¯δτ e. (24)
ii). (−C¯ ≤ C ≤ 0): in order to achieve J(D˜) ≤ τJ(D) for τ ∈ [1,− C¯J(D) ], the attacker has to modify at least the
following number of items in D.
k ≥ d1

log
(e − 1)J(D)τ − C¯δ
(e − 1)J(D)− C¯δ e. (25)
Proof. For 0 ≤ C ≤ C¯, by Theorem 4, if D˜ ∈ B(D, k), then J(D˜) ≥ max{e−k(J(D) + C¯δe−1 )− C¯δe−1 , 0}. Since
we require J(D˜) ≤ 1τ J(D), we have e−k(J(D) + C¯δe−1 )− C¯δe−1 ≤ 1τ J(D). Rearranging gives the result. The proof
for −C¯ ≤ C ≤ 0 is similar.
Note that in (24), the lower bound on k is always finite even if τ =∞, which means an attacker might be able to
reduce the attack cost J(D˜) to 0. This is in contrast to -differentially-private learner, where J(D˜) = 0 can never be
achieved. The weaker (, δ)-differential privacy guarantee gives weaker protection against attacks.
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4 Data Poisoning Attacks on Private Learners
The results in the previous section provide a theoretical bound on how effective a data poisoning attack can be against a
private learner. To evaluate how strong the protection is in practice, we propose a range of attacks targeting general
differentially-private learners. Our adversary will modify (not add or delete) any continuous features (for classification
or regression) and the continuous labels (for regression) on at most k items in the training set. Restating the attack
problem (2):
min
D˜⊂B(D,k)
J(D˜) = Eb
[
C(M(D˜, b))
]
(26)
This is a combinatorial problem—the attacker must pick k items to modify. We propose a two-step attack procedure.
step I) use heuristic methods to select k items to poison.
step II) apply stochastic gradient descent to reduce J(D˜).
In step II), performing stochastic gradient descent could lead to poisoned data taking arbitrary features or labels.
However, differentially-private learners typically assume training examples are bounded. To avoid trivially-detectable
poisoned examples, we project poisoned features and labels back to a bounded space after each iteration of SGD. We
now detail step II), assuming that the attacker has fixed k items to poison. We’ll return to step I) later.
4.1 SGD on Differentially-Private Victims (DPV)
Our attacker uses stochastic gradient descent to minimize the attack cost J(D˜). We first show how to compute a
stochastic gradient with respect to a training item.
Proposition 7. AssumeM(D˜, b) is a differentiable function of D˜, then a stochastic gradient of J(D˜) w.r.t. a particular
item z˜i is
∂C(M(D˜,b))
∂z˜i
, where b ∼ ν(b).
Proof. Note that
Eb
[
∂C(M(D˜, b))
∂z˜i
]
=
∫
∂C(M(D˜, b))
∂z˜i
ν(b)db. (27)
Under certain conditions (see appendix for the details), one can exchange the order of integration and differentiation,
and we have
Eb
[
∂C(M(D˜, b))
∂z˜i
]
=
d
∫
C(M(D˜, b))ν(b)db
dz˜i
=
dJ(D˜)
dz˜i
. (28)
Thus ∂C(M(D˜,b))∂z˜i is a stochastic gradient.
The concrete form of the stochastic gradient depends on the target private learnerM. In the following, we derive
the stochastic gradient for objective perturbation and output perturbation in the context of parameter-targeting attack
with cost function C(θ˜) = 12‖θ˜ − θ′‖2, where θ′ is the target model.
4.1.1 Instantiating Attack on Objective Perturbation
We first consider objective-perturbed private learners:
M(D˜, b) = argmin
θ∈Θ
n∑
i=1
`(θ, z˜i) + λΩ(θ) + b
>θ, (29)
where ` is some convex learning loss, Ω is a regularization, and Θ is the model space. Note that the noise b enters the
objective via linear product with the model θ. By Proposition 7, the stochastic gradient is ∂C(M(D˜,b))∂z˜i =
∂C(θ˜)
∂z˜i
, where
θ˜ =M(D˜, b) is the poisoned model. By the chain rule, we have
∂C(θ˜)
∂z˜i
=
(
∂θ˜
∂z˜i
)>
dC(θ˜)
dθ˜
. (30)
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Note that dC(θ˜)
dθ˜
= θ˜ − θ′. Next we focus on deriving ∂θ˜∂z˜i . Since (29) is a convex optimization problem, the learned
model θ˜ must satisfy the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition:
f(θ˜, z˜i) :=
n∑
j=1
∂`(θ˜, z˜j)
∂θ˜
+ λ
dΩ(θ˜)
dθ˜
+ b = 0. (31)
By using the derivative of implicit function, we have ∂θ˜∂z˜i = −(
∂f
∂θ˜
)−1 ∂f∂z˜i . We now give two examples where the base
learner is logistic regression and ridge regression, respectively.
Attacking Objective-Perturbed Logistic Regression. In the case `(θ, z˜) = log(1 + exp(−y˜θ>x˜)) and Ω(θ) =
1
2‖θ‖2, learner (29) is objective-perturbed logistic regression:
M(D˜, b) = argmin
θ∈Θ
n∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−y˜iθ>x˜i)) + λ
2
‖θ‖2 + b>θ, (32)
where Θ = Rd. Our attacker will only modify the features, thus y˜i = yi. We now derive stochastic gradient for x˜i,
which is
∂C(θ˜)
∂x˜i
= (
∂θ˜
∂x˜i
)>
dC(θ˜)
dθ˜
. (33)
To compute ∂θ˜∂x˜i , we use the KKT condition of (32):
λθ˜ −
n∑
j=1
yj x˜j
1 + exp(yj θ˜>x˜j)
+ b = 0. (34)
Let f(θ˜, x˜i) = λθ˜ −
∑n
j=1
yj x˜j
1+exp(yj θ˜>x˜j)
+ b and define sj = exp(yj θ˜>x˜j), then one can verify that
∂f
∂θ˜
= λI +
n∑
j=1
sj x˜j x˜
>
j
(1 + sj)2
. (35)
and
∂f
∂x˜i
=
six˜iθ˜
>
(1 + si)2
− yi
1 + si
I. (36)
Note that ∂θ˜∂x˜i = −(
∂f
∂θ˜
)−1 ∂f∂x˜i and
dC(θ˜)
dθ˜
= θ˜ − θ′, therefore the stochastic gradient of x˜i is
∂C(θ˜)
∂x˜i
= (
∂θ˜
∂x˜i
)>
dC(θ˜)
dθ˜
=
(
yi
1 + si
I − siθ˜x˜
>
i
(1 + si)2
)λI + n∑
j=1
sj x˜j x˜
>
j
(1 + sj)2
−1 (θ˜ − θ′). (37)
Note that the noise b enters into stochastic gradient through θ˜ =M(D˜, b).
Attacking Objective-Perturbed Ridge Regression. In the case `(θ, z˜) = 12 (y˜ − x˜>θ)2 and Ω(θ) = 12‖θ‖2,
learner (29) is the objective-perturbed ridge regression:
M(D˜, b) = argmin
θ∈Θ
1
2
‖X˜θ − y˜‖2 + λ
2
‖θ‖2 + b>θ, (38)
where Θ = {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖2 ≤ ρ}, X˜ ∈ Rn×d is the feature matrix, and y˜ ∈ Rn is the label vector. Unlike logistic
regression, the objective-perturbed ridge regression requires the model space to be bounded (see e.g. [10]). The attacker
can modify both the features and the labels. We first compute stochastic gradient for x˜i, which is
∂C(θ˜)
∂x˜i
= (
∂θ˜
∂x˜i
)>
dC(θ˜)
dθ˜
. (39)
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Since dC(θ˜)
dθ˜
= θ˜ − θ′, it suffices to compute ∂θ˜∂x˜i , for which we use the KKT condition of (38):
(X˜>X˜ + λI)θ˜ − X˜>y˜ + b+ µθ˜ = 0
1
2
‖θ˜‖2 ≤ 1
2
ρ2
µ ≥ 0
µ(‖θ˜‖2 − ρ2) = 0,
(40)
where µ is the Lagrange dual variable for constraint 12‖θ˜‖2 ≤ 12ρ2. Let f(θ˜, x˜i, µ) = (X˜>X˜ + λI)θ˜− X˜>y˜+ b+ µθ˜.
One can rewrite f(θ˜, x˜i, µ) as
f(θ˜, x˜i, µ) = (x˜ix˜
>
i +
∑
j 6=i
x˜j x˜
>
j + λI)θ˜ − x˜iy˜i −
∑
j 6=i
x˜j y˜j + b+ µθ˜. (41)
Then one can verify that
∂f
∂x˜i
= x˜iθ˜
> + (x˜>i θ˜ − y˜i)I. (42)
and
∂f
∂θ˜
= X˜>X˜ + (λ+ µ)I. (43)
Thus the stochastic gradient of x˜i is
∂C(θ˜)
∂x˜i
=
(
θ˜x˜>i + (x˜
>
i θ˜ − y˜i)I
)(
X˜>X˜ + (λ+ µ)I
)−1
(θ′ − θ˜). (44)
Next we derive the stochastic gradient of y˜i. Now view f in (41) as a function of θ˜, y˜i and µ, then one can verify that
∂f
∂y˜i
= −x˜i. (45)
and
∂f
∂θ˜
= X˜>X˜ + (λ+ µ)I. (46)
Thus the stochastic gradient of y˜i is
∂C(θ˜)
∂y˜i
= x˜>i
(
X˜>X˜ + (λ+ µ)I
)−1
(θ˜ − θ′). (47)
Note that the noise b enters into the stochastic gradient through θ˜ =M(D˜, b).
4.1.2 Instantiating Attack on Output Perturbation
We now consider the output perturbation mechanism:
M(D˜, b) = b+ argmin
θ∈Θ
{
n∑
i=1
`(θ, z˜i) + λΩ(θ)
}
. (48)
The derivations of stochastic gradient are similar to objective perturbation, thus we skip the details. Again, we instantiate
on two examples where the base learner is logistic regression and ridge regression, respectively.
Attacking Output-Perturbed Logistic Regression. The output-perturbed logistic regression takes the following
form:
M(D˜, b) = b+ argmin
θ∈Rd
{
n∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−y˜iθ>x˜i)) + λ
2
‖θ‖2
}
, (49)
Let sj = exp(yj(θ˜ − b)>x˜j), then the stochastic gradient of x˜i is
∂C(θ˜)
∂x˜i
=
(
yi
1 + si
I − si(θ˜ − b)x˜
>
i
(1 + si)2
)λI + n∑
j=1
sj x˜j x˜
>
j
(1 + sj)2
−1 (θ˜ − θ′). (50)
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Attacking Output-Perturbed Ridge Regression. The output-perturbed ridge regression takes the following form
M(D˜, b) = b+ argmin
θ∈Θ
{
1
2
‖X˜θ − y˜‖2 + λ
2
‖θ‖2
}
, (51)
where Θ = {θ : ‖θ‖2 ≤ ρ}. The KKT condition of (51) is
(X˜>X˜ + λI)(θ˜ − b)− X˜>y˜ + µ(θ˜ − b) = 0
1
2
‖θ˜ − b‖2 ≤ 1
2
ρ2
µ ≥ 0
µ(‖θ˜ − b‖2 − ρ2) = 0.
(52)
Then one can verify that the stochastic gradients of x˜i and y˜i are
∂C(θ˜)
∂x˜i
=
(
(θ˜ − b)x˜>i + x˜>i (θ˜ − b)I − y˜iI
)(
X˜>X˜ + (λ+ µ)I)
)−1
(θ′ − θ˜). (53)
∂C(θ˜)
∂y˜i
= x˜>i
(
X˜>X˜ + (λ+ µ)I
)−1
(θ˜ − θ′). (54)
4.2 SGD on Surrogate Victims (SV)
We also consider an alternative, simpler way to perform step II). When b = 0, the differentially-private learning
algorithms revert to the base learner which returns a deterministic modelM(D˜,0). The adversary can simply attack
the base learner (without b) as a surrogate for the differentially-private learnerM (with b) by solving the following
problem:
min
D˜
C(M(D˜,0)). (55)
Since the objective is deterministic, we can work with its gradient rather than its stochastic gradient, plugging in b = 0
into all derivations in section 4.1. Note that the attack found by (55) will still be evaluated w.r.t. differentially-private
learners in our experiments.
4.3 Selecting Items to Poison
Now, we return to step I) of our attack: how can we select the k items for poisoning? We give two heuristic methods:
shallow and deep selection.
Shallow selection selects top-k items with the largest initial gradient norm ‖∂J(D˜)∂z˜i |D˜=D ‖. Intuitively, modifying
these items will reduce the attack cost the most, at least initially. The precise gradients to use during selection depend on
the attack in step II). When targeting differentially-private learners directly, computing the gradient of J(D˜) is difficult.
We use Monte-Carlo sampling to approximate the gradient gi of item zi: gi ≈ 1m
∑m
s=1
∂
∂z˜i
C(M(D˜, bs)) |D˜=D, where
bs are random samples of privacy parameters. Then, the attacker picks the k items with the largest ‖gi‖ to poison.
When targeting surrogate victim, the objective is C(M(D˜,0)), thus the attacker computes the gradient of C(M(D˜,0))
of each clean item zi: gi = ddz˜iC(M(D˜,0)) |D˜=D, and then picks those k items with the largest ‖gi‖.
Deep selection selects items by estimating the influence of an item on the final attack cost. When targeting a
differentially-private victim directly, the attacker first solves the following relaxed attack problem: minD˜ J(D˜) +
αR(D˜). Importantly, here D˜ allows changes to all training items, not just k of them. R(D˜) is a regularizor penalizing
data modification with weight α > 0. We take R(D˜) =
∑n
i=1 r(z˜i), where r(z˜i) is the distance between the poisoned
item z˜i and the clean item zi. We define r(z˜i) = 12‖x˜i−xi‖2 for logistic regression and r(z˜i) = 12‖x˜i−xi‖2 + 12 (y˜i−
yi)
2 for ridge regression. After solving the relaxed attack problem with SGD, the attacker evaluates the amount of
change r(z˜i) for all training items and pick the top k to poison. When targeting a surrogate victim, the attacker can
instead solve the following relaxed attack first: minD˜ C(M(D˜,0)) + αR(D˜), and then select k top items.
In summary, we have four attack algorithms based on combinations of methods used in step I) and step II):
shallow-SV, shallow-DPV, deep-SV and deep-DPV. In the following, we evaluate the performance of these four
algorithms.
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5 Experiments
We now evaluate our attack with experiments, taking objective-perturbed learners [10] and output-perturbed learners [4]
as our victims. Through the experiment, we fix a constant step size η = 1 for (stochastic) gradient descent. After each
iteration of SGD, we project poisoned items to ensure feature norm is at most 1, and label stays in [−1, 1]. To perform
shallow selection when targeting DPV, we draw 103 samples of parameter b to evaluate the gradient of each clean item.
To perform deep selection, we use α = 10−4 to solve the corresponding relaxed attack problem.
5.1 Attacks Intelligently Modify Data
As a first example, we use label-aversion attack to illustrate that our attack modifies data intelligently. The victim is an
objective-perturbed learner for -differentially private logistic regression, with  = 0.1 and regularizer λ = 10. The
training set contains n = 21 items uniformly sampled in the interval [−1, 1] with labels yi = 1 [xi ≥ 0], see Figure 1(a).
To generate the evaluation set, we construct m = 21 evenly-spaced items in the interval [−1, 1], i.e., x∗i = 0.1i,−10 ≤
i ≤ 10 and labeled as y∗i = 1 [x∗i ≥ 0]. The cost function is defined as C(θ˜) = − 1m
∑m
i=1 log(1 + exp(−y∗i x∗i>θ˜)).
To achieve small attack cost J , a negative model θ˜ < 0 is desired.1 We run deep-DPV with k = n (attacker can modify
all items) 2 for T = 300 iterations. In Figure 1(a), we show the position of the poisoned items on the vertical axis as the
SGD iteration, t, grows. As expected, the attacker flips the positions of positive (blue) items and negative (red) items.
As a result, our attack causes the learner to find a model with θ˜ < 0.
5.2 Attacks Can Achieve Different Goals
We now study a 2D example to show that our attack is effective for different attack goals. The victim is the same as in
section 5.1. The clean training set in Figure 1(b) contains n = 317 items uniformly sampled in a unit sphere with labels
yi = 1
[
x>i θ
∗ ≥ 0] where θ∗ = (1, 1). We now describe the attack settings for different attack goals.
Label-aversion attack. We generate an evaluation set containing m = 317 grid points (x∗i , y∗i ) lying in a unit sphere
and labeled by a vertical decision boundary, see Figure 1(c). The cost function is defined as C(θ˜) = − 1m
∑m
i=1 log(1 +
exp(−y∗i x∗i>θ˜)).
Label-targeting attack. The evaluation set remains the same as in the label-aversion attack. The cost function is
defined as C(θ˜) = 1m
∑m
i=1 log(1 + exp(−y∗i x∗i>θ˜)).
Parameter-targeting attack. We first train vanilla logistic regression on the evaluation set to obtain the target model
θ′ = (2.6, 0), then define cost function as C(θ˜) = 12‖θ˜ − θ′‖2.
(a) poisoning trajectory (b) training set (c) evaluation set
Figure 1: (a) 1D example (b, c) 2D example
We run deep-DPV with k = n for T = 5× 103 iterations. In Figure 2(a)-(c), we show the poisoning trajectories for
the three attack goals respectively. Each translucent point is an original training point, and the connected solid point is
1Differentially-private machine learning typically considers homogeneous learners, thus the 1D model is just a scalar.
2Since k = n, the attacker does not need to select items in step I).
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(a) label-aversion (b) label-targeting (c) parameter-targeting
(d) label-aversion (e) label-targeting (f) parameter-targeting
Figure 2: poisoning trajectories in 2D.
its final position after attack. The curve connecting them shows the trajectory as the attack algorithm gradually poisons
the data.
In label-aversion attack the attacker aims to maximize the logistic loss on the evaluation set. It ends up moving
positive (negative) items to the left (right), so that the poisoned data deviates from the evaluation set.
In contrast, the label-targeting attack tries to minimize the logistic loss, thus items are moved to produce a poisoned
data aligned with the evaluation set. However, the attack does not reproduce exactly the evaluation set. To understand
it, we compute the model learnt by vanilla logistic regression on the evaluation set and the poisoned data, which are
(2.60,0) and (2.94,0.01). Note that both models can predict the right label on the evaluation set, but the latter has larger
norm, which leads to smaller attack cost, thus our result is a better attack.
In parameter-targeting attack, we compute the model learnt by vanilla logistic regression on the clean data and the
poisoned data, which are (1.86,1.85) and (2.21, 0.04). Note that the attack pushes the model closer to the target model
(2.6,0). Again, the attack does not reproduce exactly the evaluation set, which is because the goal is to minimize the
attack cost J = Eb
[
C(θ˜)
]
rather than C(θ˜). To see that, we evaluate the attack cost J (as explained below) on the
evaluation set and the poisoned data, and the values are 2.12 and 1.08 respectively, thus our result is a better attack.
To quantify the attack performance, we evaluate the attack cost J(D˜) via Monte-Carlo sampling. We run private
learners Te = 103 times, each time with a random bs to produce a cost Cs = C(M(D˜, bs)). Then we average to obtain
an estimate of the cost J(D˜) ≈ 1Te
∑Te
s=1 Cs. In Figure 2(d)-(f), we show the attack cost J(D˜) and its 95% confidence
interval (green, ±2∗stderr) up to t = 103 iterations. J(D˜) decreases in all plots, showing that our attack is effective for
all attack goals.
5.3 Attacks Become More Effective as k Increases
The theoretical protection provided by differential privacy weakens as the adversary is allowed to poison more training
items. In this section, we show that our attacks indeed become more effective as the number of poisoned items k
increases. The data set is the same as in section 5.2. We run our four attack algorithms with k from 20 to 100 in steps of
20. For each k, we first select k items by using shallow or deep selection, and then poison the selected items by running
(stochastic) gradient descent for T = 5×103 iterations. After attack, we estimate the attack cost J(D˜) on Te = 2×103
samples. Figure 3(a)-(c) show that the attack cost J(D˜) decreases as k grows, indicating better attack performance.
We also show the poisoning trajectory produced by deep-DPV with k = 10 in Figure 3(d)-(f). The corresponding
attack costs J(D˜) are −0.60, 0.49 and 3.43 respectively. Compared to that of k = n, −1.79, 0.32 and 1.20, we see
that poisoning only 10 items is not enough to reduce the attack cost J(D˜) significantly, although the attacker is making
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(a) label-aversion (b) label-targeting (c) parameter-targeting
(d) label-aversion (e) label-targeting (f) parameter-targeting
Figure 3: (a-c) the attack cost J(D˜) decreases as k grows. (d-f) the sparse attack trajectories for k = 10
effective modification.
5.4 Attacks Effective on Both Privacy Mechanisms
We now show experiments on real data to illustrate that our attacks are effective on both objective and output perturbation
mechanisms. We focus on label-targeting attack in this section.
The first real data set is vertebral column from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [5]. This data set contains 6
features of 310 orthopaedic patients, and the task is to predict if the vertebra of any patient is abnormal (positive class) or
not (negative class). We normalize the features so that the norm of any item is at most 1. Since this is a classification task,
we use private logistic regression with  = 0.1 and λ = 10 as the victim. To generate the evaluation set, we randomly
pick one positive item and find its 10 nearest neighbours within the positive class, and set y∗i = −1 for all 10. Intuitively,
this attack targets a small cluster of abnormal patients and the goal is to mislead the learner to classify these patients as
normal. The other experimental parameters remain the same as in section 5.3. Note that in order to push the prediction
on x∗i toward y
∗
i , the attacker requires y
∗
i x
∗
i
>θ˜ > 0, which indicates C(θ˜) = log(1 + exp(−y∗i x∗i>θ˜)) < log 2 ≈ 0.69,
so should J(D˜). As shown in Figure 4, the attacker indeed reduces the attack cost J(D˜) below 0.69 for both privacy
mechanisms, thus our attack is successful.
(a) objective perturbation (b) output perturbation
Figure 4: attack on objective and output-perturbed logistic regression.
The second data set is red wine quality from UCI. The data set contains 11 features of 1598 wine samples, and the
task is predict the wine quality, a number between 0 and 10. We normalize the features so that the norm of any item is
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at most 1. Labels are also normalized to ensure the value is in [−1, 1]. The victim is private ridge regression with  = 1,
λ = 10, and bound on model space ρ = 2. To generate the evaluation set, we pick one item x∗i with the smallest quality
value, and then set the target label to be y∗i = 1. The cost function is defined as C(θ) =
1
2 (x
∗
i
>θ − y∗i )2. The other
parameters of attack remain the same as in section 5.3. This attack aims to force the learner to predict a low-quality
wine as having a high quality. Figure 5 shows the results on objective perturbation and output perturbation respectively.
Note that the attack cost can be effectively reduced even if the attacker only poisons 100/1598 ≈ 6.3% of the whole
data set.
(a) objective perturbation (b) output perturbation
Figure 5: attack on objective and output-perturbed ridge regression.
Given experimental results above, we make another two observations here. First, deep-DPV is in general the most
effective method among four attack algorithms, see e.g. Figure 3(a), (c). Second, although deep-DPV is effective, there
remains a gap between the attack performance and the theoretical lower bound, as is shown in all previous plots. One
potential reason is that the lower bound is derived purely based on the differential privacy property, thus does not take
into account the learning procedure of the victim. Analysis oriented toward specific victim learners may result in a
tighter lower bound. Another potential reason is that our attack might not be effective enough. How to close the gap is
left as future work.
5.5 Attack Is Easier with Weaker Privacy
Finally, we show that the attack is more effective as the privacy guarantee becomes weaker, i.e., as we increase . To
illustrate, we run experiments on the data set in section 5.2, where we fix k = 100 and vary  from 0.1 to 0.5. In
Figure 6, we show the attack cost J(D˜) against . Note that the attack cost J(D˜) approaches the lower bound as 
grows. This means weaker privacy guarantee (smaller ) leads to easier attacks.
Figure 6: Attacker can reduce cost J(D˜) more as  grows.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We showed that differentially private learners are provably resistant to data poisoning attacks, with the protection
degrading exponentially as the attacker poisons more items. Then, we proposed attacks that can effectively poison
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differentially-private learners, and demonstrated the attack performance on a variety of privacy mechanisms and learners
with both synthetic and real data. While the attacks are effective, there remains a gap between the theoretical lower
bound and the empirical performance of our attacks. This could be because the lower bound is loose, or our attack is not
effective enough; closing the gap remains future work. Taken together, our study is a first step towards understanding
the strengths and weaknesses of differential privacy as a defensive measure against data poisoning.
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Appendix: Regularity Condition for Differentiation-Integration Exchange
The following theorem characterizes a sufficient condition when the order of differentiation and integration can be
exchanged (restated from Theorem 2.4.3 in [3]), which is called the regularity condition.
Theorem 8. Suppose h(z, b) is a differentiable function of z. If for each z, and there exist a function g(z, b) and a
constant d > 0 that satisfy
i). ‖ ∂∂zh(z, b) |z=z′ ‖ ≤ g(z, b), for all b and all z′ such that ‖z′ − z‖ ≤ d.
ii).
∫
g(z, b)db <∞.
Then for any z, we have
d
dz
∫
h(z, b)db =
∫
∂
∂z
h(z, b)db. (56)
Note that in condition i), the constant d could depend on z implicitly. Proposition 7 is then a straight-forward
corollary of the above theorem by taking function h as h(z˜i, b) = C(M(D˜, b))ν(b). The ν(b) is usually chosen as the
Laplace distribution ν(b) = ψe−‖b‖ for some constantψ, thus from now on we consider h(z˜i, b) = C(M(D˜, b))ψe−‖b‖.
We also require that the poisoned features and labels satisfy ‖x˜i‖ ≤ 1 and |y˜i| ≤ 1, to conform with the standard
assumption that data must be bounded in differentially private machine learning. Next we use parameter-targeting
attack as an example to illustrate that the regularity condition always holds in our attack problem.
1. Attacking objective-perturbed logistic regression.
In our case, the attacker only modifies the feature, thus we denote h(x˜i, b) = C(M(D˜, b))ψe−‖b‖. By (37),
∂C(θ˜)
∂x˜i
=
(
yi
1 + si
I − siθ˜x˜
>
i
(1 + si)2
)λI + n∑
j=1
sj x˜j x˜
>
j
(1 + sj)2
−1 (θ˜ − θ′), (57)
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where sj = exp(yj θ˜>x˜j) and θ˜ =M(D˜, b). We let d = 1 in condition i). Note that ‖x˜i‖ ≤ 1, thus for any x˜′i
such that ‖x˜′i − x˜i‖ ≤ d, by triangle inequality we have ‖x˜′i‖ ≤ ‖x˜i‖+ d = 2. Let s′i = exp(yiθ˜>x˜′i). By (57),
we have
‖∂C(θ˜)
∂x˜i
|x˜i=x˜′i ‖ ≤ ‖
yi
1 + s′i
I − s
′
iθ˜x˜
′>
i
(1 + s′i)2
‖ · ‖
λI + ∑
1≤j≤n
j 6=i
sj x˜j x˜
>
j
(1 + sj)2
+
s′ix˜
′
ix˜
′>
i
(1 + s′i)2

−1
‖ · ‖θ˜ − θ′‖
≤
(
‖ yi
1 + s′i
I‖+ ‖ s
′
iθ˜x˜
′>
i
(1 + s′i)2
‖
)
1
λ
(‖θ˜‖+ ‖θ′‖)
=
1
λ
(
1
1 + s′i
+
s′i
(1 + s′i)2
‖θ˜‖‖x˜′i‖
)
(‖θ˜‖+ ‖θ′‖)
≤ 1
λ
(1 +
1
2
‖θ˜‖)(‖θ˜‖+ ‖θ′‖) (since 1 + s′i ≥ 2
√
s′i and ‖x˜′i‖ ≤ 2).
(58)
Now we upper bound ‖θ˜‖. By (34),
‖θ˜‖ = 1
λ
‖
∑
1≤j≤n
j 6=i
yj x˜j
1 + sj
+
yix˜
′
i
1 + s′i
− b‖ ≤ 1
λ
(
∑
1≤j≤n
j 6=i
‖ yj x˜j
1 + sj
‖+ ‖ yix˜
′
i
1 + s′i
‖+ ‖b‖)
≤ 1
λ
(n− 1 + 2 + ‖b‖) = 1
λ
(n+ 1 + ‖b‖).
(59)
Plugging (59) back to (58), for all x˜′i such that ‖x˜′i − x˜i‖ ≤ 1, we have
‖∂C(θ˜)
∂x˜i
|x˜i=x˜′i ‖ ≤
1
λ
(1 +
n+ 1 + ‖b‖
2λ
)(
n+ 1 + ‖b‖
λ
+ ‖θ′‖) ≤ C1‖b‖2, (60)
for some constant C1 > 0. Therefore
‖∂h(x˜i, b)
∂x˜i
|x˜i=x˜′i ‖ = ‖
∂C(θ˜)
∂x˜i
|x˜i=x˜′i ‖ψe−‖b‖ ≤ C1ψ‖b‖2e−‖b‖. (61)
One can define g(x˜i, b) = C1ψ‖b‖2e−‖b‖, which is in fact a function of only b, to satisfy condition i) in The-
orem 8. Moreover, one can show that
∫
g(x˜i, b)db <∞, thus condition ii) is also satisfied. Therefore we can
exchange the order of differentiation and integration.
2. Attacking objective-perturbed ridge regression.
We separately show that h(x˜i, b) and h(y˜i, b) satisfy the conditions in Theorem 8.
First we consider h(x˜i, b). By (44),
∂C(θ˜)
∂x˜i
=
(
θ˜x˜>i + (x˜
>
i θ˜ − y˜i)I
)(
X˜>X˜ + (λ+ µ)I
)−1
(θ′ − θ˜). (62)
We let d = 1 in condition i). Note that ‖x˜i‖ ≤ 1, thus ‖x˜′i‖ ≤ ‖x˜i‖ + 1 ≤ 2. Since |y˜i| ≤ 1, ‖θ˜‖ ≤ ρ, and
µ ≥ 0, one can easily show that
‖∂C(θ˜)
∂x˜i
|x˜i=x˜′i ‖ ≤
1
λ
(4ρ+ 1)(ρ+ ‖θ′‖). (63)
Define g(x˜i, b) = 1λ (4ρ+ 1)(ρ+ ‖θ′‖)ψe−‖b‖. Note that
∫
g(x˜i, b)db =
1
λ (4ρ+ 1)(ρ+ ‖θ′‖) <∞, thus both
condition i) and ii) are satisfied and we can exchange the order of differentiation and integration.
Next we consider h(y˜i, b). According to (47),
∂C(θ˜)
∂y˜i
= x˜>i
(
X˜>X˜ + (λ+ µ)I
)−1
(θ˜ − θ′). (64)
16
Since ‖x˜i‖ ≤ 1, ‖θ˜‖ ≤ ρ and µ ≥ 0, one can easily show that for all y˜′i,
‖∂C(θ˜)
∂y˜i
|y˜i=y˜′i ‖ ≤
1
λ
(ρ+ ‖θ′‖). (65)
Define g(y˜i, b) = 1λ (ρ+ ‖θ′‖)ψe−‖b‖. Note that
∫
g(y˜i, b)db =
1
λ (ρ+ ‖θ′‖) <∞, thus both condition i) and
ii) are satisfied and we can exchange the order of differentiation and integration.
3. Attacking output-perturbed logistic/ridge regression.
The proof for output-perturbed logistic regression and ridge regression are similar to the objective-perturbed
learners, thus we omit them here.
For other attack goals such as label-aversion attack and label-targeting attack, the regularity condition also holds
and the proof is similar.
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